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Abstract
The data indicate that non-wage labour costs in Germany have reached a record high in recent
years. From 1972 to 2001, the ratio of non-wage labour costs to direct compensation in West
German manufacturing industry rose from 55.6 per cent to 81.2 per cent. The topic of non-
wage labour costs is increasingly being discussed among and between the political parties
because non-wage labour costs are likely to have major negative effects on employment. We
follow the real options approach, which allows us to investigate the value to a firm of waiting
to adjust labour when the firm´s revenues are stochastic and adjustment costs are sunk.
Simulation exercises show that the interaction between hiring and firing costs, non-wage
labour costs and uncertainty can have important ramifications for employment dynamics.
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1. Introduction 
 
Non-wage labour costs are the subject of intensive political debate. Payroll taxes drive a wedge 
between the cost of a worker to an employer and the wage received. If wages and prices are relatively 
flexible, high non-wage labour costs are unlikely to have major negative effects on employment in the 
long-run. However, in countries where wages and prices are inflexible, employment will suffer if non-
wage labour costs increase. Many of the job losses will fall on low-paid workers, due among other 
things to the existence of binding wage floors such as legal or collectively-bargained minimum wages. 
Increasing non-wage labour costs also tend to encourage substitution away from labour to more 
capital-intensive methods of production. Therefore, reducing social insurance contributions ranks high 
on the German political agenda.
1 
Non-wage labour costs are those categories of the enterprise's total labour costs comprising other than 
direct compensation. Non-wage labour costs account for a very substantial and rising proportion of 
total labour costs. There are several ways of defining non-wage labour costs. The annual analysis of 
non-wage labour costs in Germany by the “Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft” is based on official 
statistics from the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden, which conducts surveys on labour costs 
every four years. The official statistics distinguish between compensation for hours actually worked 
and non-wage labour costs. Non-wage labour costs are differentiated into pay for days not worked, 
special payments, statutory social welfare costs and other non-wage labour costs. The statistics 
differentiates between statutory non-wage labour costs, and non-statutory costs resulting from 
collective bargaining and additional benefits provided by the employer.
2 Table 1 below sets out the 
latest aggregate data on the development of wage and non-wage labour costs in West German 
manufacturing industries [see Schröder (2002a)]. 
 
Table 1: Annual Labour Costs in West German Manufacturing Industry per Employee in € 
  1972  1975  1978  1981  1984  1988  1992  1996  1998  2000  2001 
Direct 
Compensation 
7535  9600  11557  13616  15406  17580  21314  24218  25000  26455  27025 
Non-Wage 
Labour Costs 
4188  6304  8099  10276  12198  14149  17139  19852  20450  21505  21940 
Share of Non- 
Wage Labour 
Costs in % 
55.6  65.7  70.1  75.5  79.2  80.5  80.4  82.0  81.8  81.3  81.2 
 
                                                 
1 Over the last decade, Germany appeared to be unable to reform labour market institutions and the welfare state 
in order to reduce high and rising unemployment rates. In this respect it forms an unholy triple alliance of reform 
laggards with France and Italy [see Minford and Naraidoo (2002)]. 
2 However, one should bear in mind that some non-statutory non-wage labour costs - such as holidays - may 
result from the implementation of labour law and additional collective agreements by the social partners. To a 
certain extent these kinds of costs might also be attributed to statutory non-wage labour costs.   3 
In West German manufacturing industry, non-wage labour costs reached an all-time high of € 21940 
in 2001.
3 From 1972 to 2000, the ratio of non-wage labour costs to direct compensation grew by 25.6 
percentage points to 81.2%. For 2003, a further rise in non-wage labour costs is predicted. In January 
2003, the contribution rates for all types of social insurance were raised again and a further increase of 
statutory social welfare contributions of employers is expected for 2004. This means uncertainty for 
firms about whether and, if so, when a further increase is to be expected.  
The disaggregate data in Table 2 indicate that the rise of non-wage labour costs from 1992 to 2001 can 
be attributed to increases in both the statutory and the non-statutory elements. A special role is played 
by the increases in the costs of social security contributions, which rose at a significantly higher rate in 
the East than in the West. Furthermore, increases in costs caused by sick pay, and holidays and holiday 
payments, were of importance. 
 
Table 2: Non-Wage Labour Costs in Manufacturing Industry as % of Direct Compensation 
     West Germany    East Germany 
  1992  2001  1992  2001 
Statutory Non-Wage Labour Costs  35.4  37.1  34.6  37.8 
Employer´s Contribution to Social Security  25.4  28.4  26.2  28.9 
Paid Public Holidays  4.5  5.0  3.7  4.6 
Sickness Payments  5.1  3.3  3.9  3.2 
Other Statutory Allowances  0.4  0.4  0.8  1.1 
Non-Statutory Non-Wage Labour Costs  45.0  44.1  31.7  30.5 
Holiday Payments  19.3  18.6  13.6  15.4 
Special Payments  9.2  8.3  3.9  4.0 
Pension Schemes  7.4  7.7  0.7  1.7 
Capital-Forming Payments  1.3  1.1  0.1  0.4 
Other Non-Wage Labour Costs  7.8  8.4  13.4  9.0 
Total Non-Wage Labour Costs  80.4  81.2  66.3  68.3 
Source: Schröder (2002a); the calculations are based on compensation for hours actually worked. 
 
Table 3 indicates that there is significant variation in non-wage labour costs across countries. Hourly 
labour costs in West German manufacturing amounted to € 26.16 in 2001. This was 27% above the 
average of countries compared. A great deal of this difference was due to non-wage labour costs (€ 
11.72 per hour) which were 54% above average in Germany. Given this evidence, there is widespread 
agreement among the employers and the main political parties that non-wage labour costs are “far too 
high” and have to be reduced because they drive up labour costs and thus reduce the demand for 
labour. Firms also claim that uncertainty about the future level of non-wage labour costs  is an 
impediment to job creation. Therefore, they form expectations and beliefs on the future behaviour of 
the driving economic variables, which cannot be predicted with certainty. The modelling framework 
                                                 
3 In East German manufacturing industry, annual direct compensation (non-wage labour costs) reached € 18825 
(€ 12855)  in 2001 and therefore the share of non-wage labour costs reached 68.3% of total compensation. 
Though rising, non-wage labour in eastern Germany were still lower than in western Germany. The differences 
result from less generous fringe benefits such as vacation and supplementary pension schemes.   4 




Table 3: International Comparison of Hourly Wages in the Manufacturing Industry (2001, in €) 
  Direct Hourly Wages  Non-Wage Labour Costs  Share of Non-Wage 
Labour Costs in % 
Austria  10.90  10.10  93 
Belgium  11.84  11.31  96 
Canada  13.07  4.97  38 
Denmark  19.58  4.91  25 
East Germany  10.09  6.76  67 
Finland  12.51  9.61  77 
France  9.89  9.03  91 
Greece  5.27  3.59  68 
Ireland  11.47  4.54  40 
Italy  8.14  7.77  96 
Japan  13.13  9.09  69 
Netherlands  12.18  9.80  80 
Norway  17.12  8.22  48 
Portugal  3.79  2.96  78 
Spain  8.01  6.67  83 
Sweden  12.35  8.56  69 
Switzerland  16.37  8.59  53 
UK  13.41  5.82  43 
US  16.57  6.42  39 
West Germany  14.44  11.72  81 
 
Orthodox theory suggests to calculate the net present value (NPV) of a mooted employment decision. 
When the present value of future profits is bigger than the present value of the costs of hiring a worker 
– that is, the NPV is positive – then go ahead. All employment calculations therefore rely on predicting 
uncertain future profits. But the traditional theory also assumes, implicitly, that employment decisions 
are a now-or-never choice. In many circumstances this is unrealistic and waiting offers a valuable 
chance to learn more about the likely fate of the decision. The ability to delay a partially irreversible 
employment decision is like a financial “call option”. The firm has the right, but not the obligation, to 
buy (hire) a security (new employees) at a specified price (the hiring cost) at a future time of its 
choosing. This option has a value. When the firm makes the investment it exercises (or, in financial 
jargon, “kills”) its option. It follows then, that the cost of that “killed” option (the value of waiting for 
better information) ought to be included when calculating the NPV. Before a hiring decision goes 
                                                 
4 An interesting feature is that some European countries succeeded to restore lower rates of unemployment in the 
1990s despite a high share of non-wage labour costs. A remarkable example for the way out of Europe´s labour 
market misery are the Netherlands. The Dutch employer associations and unions reached a historic agreement on 
wage moderation (the so-called Wassenaar Agreement) in 1992. It turned out that wage moderation was an 
essential ingredient of the Dutch success story. The Dutch experience is consistent with the well-known hump-
shaped relationship between the degree of bargaining coordination and the real wage level of Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) saying that labour markets work best in those countries with either very decentralised or very 
centralised wage formation systems.   5 
ahead, the present value of future profits should exceed the hiring costs by at least the value of keeping 
the real option alive.
5 In other words, real options are directly analogous to a traditional American call 
option.
6 While real options are similar, the primary distinction is the non-financial nature of the 
underlying asset being acquired.
7 
Against this background, the paper proceeds as follows. The application of the real options approach 
to employment determination is sketched in section 2. Section 3 discusses the simulation results. A 
summary and some policy conclusions are provided in section 4. Additional appendices provide 
technical results used in the body of the paper. 
 
2. Labour Demand and Non-Wage Labour Costs in a Real Options Framework  
 
In valuing real options, one inevitably faces a trade-off between the analytical and computational 
tractability, and the complexity of the underlying model. In the light of this trade-off, academic 
economists have found it convenient to impose sufficient structure on the model to give closed-form 
solution. Following this strategy, we consider a representative firm facing  constant returns to scale 
CES production function 
 
(1)  ( ) [ ]
m m m q q
1
1
- - - - + = L K Y  
 
where Y denotes output,  -1 <  m
 
<  ¥  is the substitution parameters (m„ 0),  1 0 < <q   is  the 
distribution parameters,  L  is the number of employees,  and  K is the capital stock. We allow for 
imperfect competition, i.e. we assume that the firm faces an isoelastic demand function 
  
(2)  ( ) Z Y p y y - = 1 ,  y ‡ 1, 
 
where p represents the price, Z denotes the demand shock, and y is an elasticity parameter that takes 
its minimum value of 1 under perfect competition [see, Abel and Eberly (1994)]. Therefore, current 
profits, measured in units of output, are defined as, 
 
                                                 
5 In fact, that is usually happening in practice. Firms calculate the NPV, but discount predicted profits using a 
„hurdle“ required rate of return which is much higher than the standard discount rate to account for the 
uncertainty underlying the project. Applying traditional options-pricing theory to employment decisions leads to 
the conclusion that such hurdle rates are perfectly sensible. However, the real options theory allows firms to set 
them on a more rational basis than gut instinct.  
6 A European option can only be exercised on the expiration date whereas an American option can be exercised   
at any time up to and included the expiration date. 
7 The analogy arises because labour adjustment costs are at least partially sunk. Real option theory therefore 
provides an extremely useful method of unlocking the value in employment decisions. The real options literature   6 
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where t denotes the ratio of non-wage labour costs and w is real wage. To keep the model simple we 
abstract from taxes. The representative risk-neutral firm maximises its discounted flow of profits 
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where V denotes the intertemporal profit function and r is the real interest rate. To evaluate the impact 
of non-wage labour costs u pon labour demand, it is necessary to recognise that production and 
employment are inherently dynamic and uncertain processes. We therefore assume that the stochastic 
demand factor Z follows the geometric Brownian motion  
 
(5)  v s h Zd Zdt dZ + =  
 
where v  is a Wiener process,  dt d e v =  (since e is a normally distributed random variable with 
mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), h is the drift term and s  is the variance parameter. Thus, 
we have an optimal stopping problem – we must determine when it is optimal to hire or fire workers, 
given the stochastic evolution of Z. Additionally, it is assumed that the payroll tax t follows the jump 
processes   
 
(6)   2 1 dJ dJ d + = t , 
 
where  1 dJ  and  2 dJ  are the increments of Poisson processes (with mean arrival rates l1 and l2). It is 
assumed that if an “event 1” (“event 2”) occurs, t increases (falls) by f1 (f2) percent with probability 
1.
8 Over each time interval dt there is a probability l1dt (or l2dt) that it will rise (drop) by f1t (f2t). 
Additionally, we assume that (dJ1, dJ2) and  dv  are independent to each other, i.e.  ( ) 0 1 = dJ d E v , 
                                                                                                                                                        
is too vast to survey here. Excellent surveys are provided by Amran and Kulatilaka (1999), Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001), Coy (1999), Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Lander and Pinches (1998). 
8 Given the high level of unemployment, the German government has implemented an environmental tax reform 
in several stages since 1999 and has used the proceeds to cut employer and employees contributions to the 
pension fund. This policy-induced fall of non-wage labour costs may be represented by „event 2“ in equation (6). 
Environmental taxation is often seen as an attractive solution for cutting unemployment. Such a reform may 
yield a „double dividend“: not only an improvement in environmental quality but also a boost to labour demand. 
The idea of a „double dividend“ has been discussed extensively in the economic literature. Now, the consensus 
view among economists seems to be that a green tax reform is unlikely to generate a significant „double 
dividend“, if previous policies have been economically rational and if other distortions in the economy exist. 
Excellent surveys of the debate are available in Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1999).     7 
( ) 0 2 = dJ d E v  and  E(dJ1dJ2) = 0. Equation (5) and  (6) indicate that there are two sources of 
uncertainty. Type I uncertainty represented by the geometric Brownian motion captures price and/or 
demand uncertainty. Instability of this type may be helpful in predicting the variability in profits. To 
understand the policy impact upon labour demand, we have additionally assumed type II uncertainty 
(represented by the two jump processes). This newly added uncertainty represents political uncertainty 
about future changes in non-wage labour costs and allows to investigate how uncertainty about future 
non-wage labour costs alters incentives for employment. In our work, the timing of the potential 
policy shifts is exogenous.
9 In other words, our model contains two uncorrelated jumps and the 
behaviour between the jumps is that of a „Gaussian“ diffusion („Poisson-Gaussian model“). The 
critical question for the firm is how best to respond in such an uncertain environment.
10 
Using Itô´s Lemma, the Bellman equation for the value V at time zero is   
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To find the optimal condition for employees with the existence of firing costs and hiring costs, we 
need to obtain the value of the marginal employed worker first  ( ) N V v =  and then compare the 
marginal value of employees with the marginal hiring costs and firing costs (variable subscripts denote 
partial derivatives). We take the derivative of (7) with respect to L 
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where  N V v =  is the value of employing the marginal worker and  
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9 In practical terms, we are not exploring endogenous uncertainty but exogenous uncertainty that may (or may 
not) be resolved with time but cannot be resolved by action on part of the firm. Alternatively, one can assume 
endogenous uncertainty. Jumps might be correlated because their amplitudes are drawn from correlated 
distributions, or because the correlation in the jump times (the jumps may be simultaneous, or have correlated 
stochastic arrival intensities). This correlated „double-jump“ approach is richer and more complete. A general 
characterisation of such affine jump-diffusions models is available in Duffie et al. (2000). 
10 Bentolila and Bertola (1990) have developed a dynamic model of labour demand with type I uncertainty, but 
have not considered policy uncertainty (type II uncertainty).   8 
The solution for  ( ) Z v  consists of the particular integral and the complementary function. We first deal 
with identification of uncertainty effects in the very special case where hiring and firing costs are zero. 
This special case turns out to be useful as a starting point and for comparisons. Then we turn to the 
general case with positive hiring and firing costs. In the absence of hiring and firing costs, the 
particular integral may be expressed as 
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which is the expected present value of the marginal employed worker. E[￿] denotes the expectation 
operator given information at initial time t=0. This integral can be rewritten as (a proof is given in 
Appendix A) 
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The real discount rate for  ( ) L K ZF ,  is  h - r  since Z grows at an expected rate of h. The real wage, 
w, is exogenous and then has a discount rate of r. The current value of t  has a discount rate adjusted 
by the possibilities of jumps and drops in the future value of t . 
The firm’s option value of hiring in the future and its option value of firing once the worker is 
employed are measured by the complementary function: 
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Letting  vG be the value of the option, the general solutions for the hiring and firing options ( G
H v  and 
G
F v ) have the following forms, respectively (see Appendix B for details), 
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where b1 and b2 are the positive and negative roots of the following characteristic equation:   9 
 
(15)  ( ) 0 1
2
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To satisfy the boundary conditions that  ( ) 0 0 = G
H v  and  ( ) ¥ G
F v  = 0, we use the positive solution for 
G
H v  
and the negative solution for 
G
F v .  
We now add fixed marginal hiring (H) and firing (F) costs to the model with both H and F being 
payable by the firm.
11 When there are fixed costs of either hiring or firing, the firm will consider the 
option value of maintaining her current position against the alternative of hiring or firing. In other 
words, it should be evident that the hiring and firing policy of the optimising firm is discontinuous. In 
some periods the optimal strategy of the firm will be to adjust the number of workers. Under other 
demand conditions a wait and see attitude will be chosen. More specifically, employment inaction will 
always be chosen when deviations of the expected marginal product of labour from the optimal level 
do not justify the costs of employment adjustment. Hiring and firing costs therefore generate a corridor 
of inaction (wait and see attitude for the time being) within which firms do not change their workforce. 
This region is identified by the upper, ZH, and lower, ZF, control barrier. The definitions of the hiring 
and firing barriers,  F H Z Z   and   , are given by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions 
below. It is straightforward to show that according to the value-matching conditions the firm would 
find it optimal to exercise its option to hire or fire the marginal worker once Z hits one of the two 
barriers: 
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The left-hand sides of (16) and (17) show the marginal benefit from hiring/firing a worker and the 
right-hand sides the corresponding marginal costs. The marginal benefit of hiring a worker is equal to 
the sum of the present discounted value of his productivity net of wages and the value of the option to 
fire him. The firm’s ability to fire raises the benefit from employing a worker. The marginal cost of 
hiring is the sum of the direct hiring costs and the sacrificed option to hire him in the future. By hiring 
                                                 
11 H can be thought of as representing the screening and training costs associated with the recruitment of a new 
employee and F as the severance costs imposed by legislation when dismissing an employee.   10 
a worker today, the opportunity to do so in the future – when conditions may be more favourable – is 
sacrificed. Similarly, by firing a worker, the opportunity to do so in the future – when demand 
conditions may be even more adverse – is sacrificed, and the opportunity to hire him again is gained. 
The smooth-pasting conditions ensure that hiring (firing) is not optimal either before nor after the 
hiring (firing) threshold is reached. In technical terms, this means 
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Equations (16)  - (19) form a non-linear system of equations with four unknown parameters, 
2 1   and   ,   ,  Z , A A Z F H , and can be solved for numerically once the solutions for b1 and b2 are obtained 
from (15).  In order to visualise our approach to e mployment determination, we next consider 
calibrations of the model. These make the model amenable to graphical analysis. 
 
3. Calibration and Results 
 
The preceding section has laid out the model economy. Having illustrated that the stochastic 
framework has important ramifications for the dynamic behaviour of labour demand, we proceed in 
this section to use the theoretical models derived above to carry out a number of simulations to shed 
light on the workings of the models and the economic forces at work.
 12 For this reason, the model is 
calibrated in order to match characteristics of the German economy. In other words, an intuitive 
interpretation of the model is provided, and throughout the remainder of the paper no background in 
stochastic calculus is necessary to understand the arguments in the text. 
The unit time length corresponds to one year. Our base parameters are s = 0.15, h = 0.0,  1 l =0.1, 
2 l =0.1,  1 f =0.1,  2 f =0.1, K = 1, r = 0.04, w = 1, H = 0.1, F = 0.6, Y = 1.5, m = 0.4825, q = 0.3, and t  
= 0.75. Where possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical labour studies. The firing and 
hiring parameters are consistent with those in Bertolila and Bertola (1990) for Germany. Their 
estimated firing costs for Germany are in the range 0.562 £ F £ 0.750 and their hiring cost estimate 
(excluding on-the-job-training) for Germany is 0.066 of the average annual wage. Our specification (H   11 
= 0.10) is also broadly consistent with the recruiting and training cost of two months in Mortenson and 
Pissarides´ (1999) calibration.
13 They suggest that this number is consistent with survey results 
reported in Hamermesh (1993). The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour 1/(1+m) = 0.7 
has been taken from Pissarides (1998). Point estimates for t have been derived from Table 1 and 3. 
Finally, the price elasticity of demand parameter is set at Y = 1.50 as in Bovenberg et al. (1998). The 
determination of some parameters, however, requires the use of judgement, i.e. they reflect a back-of-
the-envelope calculation.
14 
To motivate the analysis of policy uncertainty, special attention has to be paid to the calibration of the 
Poisson processes. The Poisson process implies that the likelihood of a policy change is determined by 
the arrival rate l. This means that the time t one has to wait for the switch event to occur is a random 
variable whose distribution is exponential with parameter l: 
 
(20)  { } e
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The corresponding probability density is 
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In other words, the probability that the event will occur sometime within the short interval between t0 
and t0+dt is approximately le
-ltdt. In particular, the probability that it will occur within dt from now 
(when t = 0) is approximately ldt. In this sense l is the probability per unit of time. Moreover, the 
number of policy changes (x) that will take place over any interval of length D is distributed according 
to the Poisson distribution 
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12 The numerical computation of the trigger points is less complex than one would think. The numerical 
boundary value problem is solved with the method of Newton-Raphson for nonlinear systems. For a description 
of the algorithm used to compute the numerical simulations, see Press et al. (2002). 
13 Firing costs have increased substantially in Germany in the late 1960s and 1970s and have roughly stayed on 
this high level since then [see, Caballero and Hammour (1997)]. The OECD (1999) has compiled a 
comprehensive dataset describing legislative firing (procedural requirements, notification periods, severance pay, 
special requirements for collective dismissals, and short-time work schemes) and hiring (rules favouring 
disadvantaged groups, conditions for temporary and fixed-term contracts, training requirments) costs covering 
22 indicators for 27 countries. These 22 indicators provide the inputs for the construction of cardinal summary 
indicators of employment protection across countrties. These indicators of strictness of employment protection in 
the late 1990s are also available in the DICE database (for further details, see www.cesifo.de). 
14 Note, however, that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise quantitative estimates of the impact of 
various labour market regulations, but rather to illustrate the qualitative predictions of a partial equilibrium 
model and to identify key features of the framework in determining the policy´s quantitative impact.   12 
whose expected value is the arrival rate times the length of the interval lD. We can back out from 
equation (22) the agent´s beliefs about policy changes. As a guide to calibration, Table 4 below 
provides the probabilities that either one (x = 1) or three (x = 3) jumps will occur within 5 years (D = 
5) or 10 years (D = 10) for the four arrival rates l = 0.01, l = 0.05, l = 0.10 and l = 0.15, respectively. 
For example, for l = 0.05 the probability that one jump will occur within 5 years is 19.5 percent.  
 
Table 4: Jump Probabilities for the Poisson Process 
  l = 0.01   l = 0.05  l = 0.10  l = 0.15 
prob{1 event in 5 years}  0.048  0.195  0.303  0.354 
prob{3 events in 5 years}  0.000002  0.002  0.013  0.033 
prob{1 event in 10 years}  0.090  0.303  0.368  0.395 
prob{3 events in 10 years}  0.0001  0.012  0.061  0.126 
 
Given the high probability of increasing non-wage labour costs in Germany, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed over the grid li ˛ {0.0,0.2} for i = 1,2. 
 





































































































































First, we consider a policy which changes hiring and firing costs. Despite the fact that liberalisation of 
labour markets has ranked highly in European policy debates, few effective changes to the stringent 
nature of the employment constraints facing European firms appear to have been implemented over 
the last decade. Moreover, in a number of European countries the general trend towards greater 
employment protection would actually appear to have continued. The numerical results are given in 
Figure 1. The major result of the calibrations is that higher hiring and firing costs lead to an increase of 
the no action area, i.e. increasing hiring and/or firing increases the hiring threshold (ZH) and decreases 
the firing threshold (ZF). The net impact upon employment turns out to be negative because the hiring   13 
thresholds are steeper, compared to the firing ones.  This asymmetric widening of the region of 
inaction implies that German unemployment is caused not so much by an increased probability of 































Figure 2 investigates numerically the impact of higher non-wage costs levels. The graph clearly 
indicates that a higher share of non-wage labour costs (t) leads to an increase of ZH and ZF and a 
widening of the wait and see area. 
Figure 3 provides a sensitivity analysis of the thresholds with respect to l1 and l2, i.e. we illustrate the 
impact of  uncertainty about future non-wage labour costs upon the optimal hiring and firing 
thresholds. Alternatively, one may say that we consider different degrees of „policy-jumpiness“. The 
3-D graphs clearly indicate the entire no-action areas. If l1 increases, then the ZH  investment threshold 
will rise – firms will be more reluctant to hire to avoid getting caught with too much workers, should 
the future turn out worse than expected. By contrast, if the future turns out better than expected, the 
firm can just hire more workers as needed. The implication is that the textbook net present value rule 
is blantly inappropriate in any context other than the unrealistic setting where sunk costs are negligible 
and there is certainty regarding the determinants of the profitability of the project to be undertaken. On 
the contrary, if l2 increases, then the ZH  threshold declines. In other words, uncertainty about future 
non-wage labour costs pushes up the real option “price” and increases the advantages to the firm of 
                                                 
15 This feature is consistent with the empirical evidence in Bean (1994), p. 576. More indirectly, countries where 
employment is protected tend also to discourage business start-ups. Fonseca st al. (2001) have shown that 
impediments to firm formation are strongly and negatively correlated with the employment to population ratio. 
This leads to the „all or nothing“ warning issued by Coe and Snower (1997). They argue that piecemeal labour 
market reforms may have had so little success because they disregarded the complementarities between a braod 
range of policies and institutions. Hence, what is needed is a fundamental labour market reform which is both 
broad and deep.   14 
waiting. The theory therefore explains why firms often respond slowly to changes in policy variables – 
all of which, orthodox theory suggests, should elicit an instant response.
16 
 




















































































































































Figure 4 shows how the magnitude of the jumps (represented by f1) affects the thresholds. Two main 
messages emerge from Figure 4. The first concerns the hiring and firing thresholds: The simulations 
suggest that perceived upside risks act as an important deterrent to hirings and firings. Pari passu, an 
unreliable political environment system translates into higher thresholds and hence lowers the 
efficiency of the economy. 
                                                 
16 When real options are such a useful and powerful tool, why haven´t they been more widely adopted?  The 
main reason probably is that real options are rather difficult to explain – it´s a daunting task to communicate 
them effectively.   15 
Let us now consider changes in s. In other words, we analyse the sensitivity of the optimal thresholds 
with respect to changes in the volatility of the geometric Brownian motion representing demand and/or 
price uncertainty. As in the existing literature, we find that the threshold value at which hiring takes 
place is increasing in the “noisiness” level even though the firm is risk neutral. In volatile 
environments, the best tactic is to keep options open and await new information rather than commit an 
employment decision today. The intuition is that the firm can counteract the impact from additional 
uncertainty by a wait and see attitude for the time being. 
 















































LH,  t = 0.8
 
 
In order to gain additional insight into the model, Figure 6 shows how non-wage labour costs affect 
the labour demand schedule. We investigate t = 0.8 and t = 0.6. For each parameterisation, the hiring   16 
and firing employment thresholds are derived for  Z = 3.5 with the fact that marginal value of 
employees from particular solutions are the same with Z and  L thresholds. The firm would hire a 
marginal worker if the employment falls below  H L ; and the firm would fire a marginal employee if 
the employment level is more than  F L . The comparison of the curves reveals that higher non-wage 
labour costs reduce labour demand. This again highlights the interdependencies between labour 
markets and a social security system which is tied to employment. 
 
4. Summary Remarks and Conclusions 
 
Germany has one of the  highest unemployment rates  – 11.% or 4.5 million people – in the rich 
world.
17 Against this gloomy background, chancellor Schröder and his government have taken some 
encouraging steps in their “Agenda 2010”. Most strikingly they have proposed substantial cuts in the 
duration and amounts of unemployment and non-wage labour costs (sickness benefits). The 
government has also suggested ways that would weaken job-protection in small companies and 
encourage employers to hire new workers.
18 In detail, the government has agreed to make firing rules 
more flexible by letting small firms take on a sixth worker – or more – on a fixed-term contract 
without the other employees becoming eligible for full job protection. In larger firms, the government 
proposes offering anyone laid off a choice between a fixed amount of compensation, not automatically 
available at present, and seeking redress in the courts, in which case the worker would have to 
renounce all rights to financial compensation. This procedure would help to avoid the long, 
unpredictable and costly legal proceedings that always follow any attempt to lay off workers in 
Germany. Furthermore, the government says it will encourage wage bargaining at the company level 
by making it easier for firms to opt out of the straitjacket of sector-wide  agreements  when 
circumstances so require. Above all, the government is determined to reduce the non-wage costs of 
labour. Of course, the model developed in this paper is stylised and may not capture all of the detail. 
Nevertheless, the modelling exercise clearly indicates that such a reform package – if boldly and fully 
implemented – will push Germany in the right direction.
19 
                                                 
17 Germany´s labour market institutions have by and large been kept unchanged over the last thirty years. 
Therefore, their interaction with changes in the economic environment is the most plausible 1candidate for 
explaining rising unemployment. Economic conditions have become more volatile over the last ten years due to 
globalisation and the transition to the new economy. This explanations is in fact the gist of papers by Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000), Chen et al. (2002) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002). 
18 In the run-up to the general elections in September 2002, the German government has shown itself still less 
reform-minded.  For instance, the new regulations on worker participation in shop-floor decision making mean 
greater bureaucratic outlays and less flexibility in decision making.  
19 However, it is crucial to recognise that Germany is in fact stuck in a web of anti-competitive rigidities which 
involve all markets. Recent research suggests that policies enhancing product market competition contribute to 
higher output and employment growth over the medium to longer term. While it is recognised that the structural 
reforms necessary to enhance product market competition may entail short-term dislocation of labour, over the 
longer run these policies will reduce monopolistic tendencies, weaken insider-outsider mechanisms and thereby   17 
Appendix A: Derivation of Equation (11) 
 
Assume that the particular solution for the shadow price of employees has the following functional 
form as the particular integral components: 
 
(A1)  ( ) t Dw Cw L K BZF v + + = , . 
 
Then, we have  
 
(A2)  ( ) L K BZF ZvZ , h h = , 
 
(A3)  0 = ZZ v , 
 
(A4)  ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 tf l f t l Dw v v = - + , 
 
(A5)  ( ) ( ) [ ] 2 2 2 2 1 tf l f t l Dw v v = - - . 
 
Substituting into equation (8) yields 
 
(A6)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 ,   1 , , ,
tf l
tf l h t t
Dw
Dw L K BZF w N L K ZF Dw Cw L K BZF r
-
+ + + - = + +
. 
 
Rearranging and collecting terms yields 
 
(A7)  ( )( ) [ ] [ ] ( ) [ ] 0 1 1 1 , 2 2 1 1 = + + - + + + - - D r w rC w B r L K ZF f l f l t h . 
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It is then straightforward to obtain equation (11). 
 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of Equations (13) and (14) 
 
The homogeneous solutions to equation  (12) should have the same components as the particular 
solutions. Assume the homogeneous solutions have the functional form 
 
(B1)  C B AZ v + + = t
b . 
 
Then we have 
                                                                                                                                                        
lead to higher levels of overall employment. At the same time, such an institutional setting should also contribute 
to a more innovative and dynamic economy by thriving entrepreneurial activity [Acemoglu et al. (2002)]. 
   18 
 
(B2)  b hb h AZ ZvZ = , 
 
(B3)  ( )




1 2 2 2 - = , 
 
(B4)  ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 tf l f t l B v v = - + , 
 
(B5)  ( ) ( ) [ ] 2 2 2 2 1 tf l f t l B v v = - - , 
 
Now substitute into equation (12) in the text. It is straightforward to obtain the following characteristic 
equation: 
 




tf l tf l b b s hb t b b b B B AZ AZ C B AZ r - + - + = + +  
 
Rearranging and collecting terms yields 
 
(B7)  ( ) ( ) 0 1
2
1
2 2 1 1






- + - tf l tf l t hb b b s
b B B C B r AZ r r  
 
Equation (B7) must hold for any value of A, B, and C.  Thus, we have 
 
(B8)  ( ) 0 1
2
1 2 = - + - r hb b b s  
 
(B9)  ( ) 2 2 1 1 tf l tf l t B B C B r - = +  
 
Note that (B9) would generate the same solutions as part of particular solutions with the value of 
r w C t - = . Therefore only equation (B8) consists of homogenous solutions. Note that there are two 
roots for characteristic equation (B8). Therefore, the general solutions are denoted by 
 
(B10)  2 1
2 1
b b Z A Z A v
G + = , 
 




   19 
References: 
 
Abel, A.B. and J.C. Eberly (1994) “A Unified Model of Investment Under Uncertainty”,  American 
Economic Review 84, 1369-1384. 
 
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and F. Zilibotti (2002) “Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic 
Growth”, NBER Working Paper No. 9066, Cambridge (Mass.). 
 
Amran, M. and N. Kulatilaka (1999) Real Options: Managing Strategic Investment in an Uncertain 
World, Boston (Harvard Business School Press). 
 
Bean, C.R. (1994) “European Unemployment: A Survey”, Journal of Economic Literature 32, 573-
619.  
 
Bentolila, S. and G. Bertola (1990) "Firing Costs and Labor Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?", 
Review of Economic Studies 57, 381-402. 
 
Blanchard, O. and J. Wolfers (2000) “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European 
Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence”, The Economic Journal 110, C1-C33.  
 
Bovenberg, A.L. (1999) “Green Tax Reforms and the Double Dividend: An Updated Reader´s Guide”, 
International Tax and Public Policy 6, 421-443.  
 
Bovenberg, A.L., J.J. Graafland and R.A. de Mooij (1998) Tax Reform and the Dutch Labor Market: 
An Applied General Equlibrium Approach, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 
Research Memorandum 143, The Hague. 
 
Caballero, R. and M. Hammour (1997) “Jobless Growth: Appropriability, Factor Substitution, and 
Unemployment”, NBER Working Paper No. 6221, Cambridge (Mass.). 
 
Calmfors, L. and J. Driffill (1988) „Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic 
Performance“, Economic Policy, No. 3, 13-61.  
 
Chen, Y.-F., Snower, D . and G. Zoega (2002) “Labour Market Institutions and Macroeconomic 
Shocks”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3480, London. 
 
Coe, D. and D.J. Snower (1997) „Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labour 
Market Reform“, IMF Staff Papers 44, 1-35. 
 
Copeland, T. and V. Antikarov (2001) Real Options – A Practitioner´s Guide, London (Texere 
Publishing). 
 
Coy, R. (1999) „Exploiting Uncertainty: The Real-Options Revolution in Decision Making“, Business 
Week, June 7, 118-124. 
 
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994)  Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton (Princeton University 
Press). 
 
Duffie, D., Pan, J. and K. Singleton (2000) „Transform Analysis and Asset Pricing for Affine Jump 
Diffusions“, Econometrica 68, 1343-1376. 
 
Forseca, R., Lopez-Gardia, P. and C. Pissarides (2001) “Entrepreneurship, Start-Up Costs and 
Employment”, European Economic Review 45, 692-705.   
   20 
Goulder, L. (1995) “Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader´s Guide”, 
International Tax and Public Finance 2, 157-183.  
 
Hamermesh, D.S. (1993) Labor Demand, Princeton (Princeton University Press). 
 
Lander, D.M. and G.E. Pinches (1998) “Challenges to the Practical Implementation of Modeling and 
Valuing Real Options”, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 38, 537-567.  
 
Ljungqvist, L. and T. Sargent (2002) “The European Unemployment Experience”, CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 3543, London. 
 
Minford, P. and R. Naraidoo (2002) “Vicious and Virtuous Circles  – The Political Economy of 
Unemployment”, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3618, London. 
 
Mortenson, D.T. and C.A. Pissarides (1999) "New Developments in Models of Search in the Labor 
Market", in: Ashenfelter, O.C. and D. Card (eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics Vol. 3B, 2567-2627 
Amsterdam (Elsevier Science).  
 
OECD (1999) Employment Outlook, Paris. 
 
Pissarides, C. (1998) "The Impact of Employment Tax Cuts on Unemployment and Wages: The Role 
of Unemployment Benefits and Tax Structure", European Economic Review 42, 155-183. 
 
Press, W.H., Teukolsky, S.A., Vetterling, W.T. and B.P. Flannery (2002) Numerical Recipes in C++: 
The Art of Scientific Computing, 2
nd edition, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press). 
 
Schröder, C. (2002a) “Personalzusatzkosten in der deutschen Wirtschaft”, iw-trends 29, Nr. 1, 40-46. 
 




 CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
________________________________________________________________________
888  Bernard Steunenberg, Coordinating Sectoral Policymaking: Searching for
Countervailing Mechanisms in the EU Legislative Process, March 2003
889  Eytan Sheshinski, Optimum Delayed Retirement Credit, March 2003
890  Frederick van der Ploeg, Rolling Back the Public Sector – Differential effects on
employment, investment and growth, March 2003
891  Paul De Grauwe and Marc-Alexandre Sénégas, Monetary Policy in EMU when the
Transmission is Asymmetric and Uncertain, March 2003
892  Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad, Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm
Ownership Structure, March 2003
893  Harry Flam, Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession, March 2003
894  Mathias Hoffmann and Ronald MacDonald, A Re-examination of the Link between
Real Exchange Rates and Real Interest Rate Differentials, March 2003
895  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg, and Tor Helge Holmås, A Panel Data Study of
Physicians’ Labor Supply: The Case of Norway, March 2003
896  Dennis C. Mueller, Rights and Citizenship in the European Union, March 2003
897  Jeremy Edwards, Gains from Trade in Tax Revenue and the Efficiency Case for Trade
Taxes, March 2003
898  Rainer Fehn and Thomas Fuchs, Capital Market Institutions and Venture Capital: Do
They Affect Unemployment and Labour Demand?, March 2003
899  Ronald MacDonald and Cezary Wójcik, Catching Up: The Role of Demand, Supply and
Regulated Price Effects on the Real Exchange Rates of Four Accession Countries,
March 2003
900  R. Selten, M. Schreckenberg, T. Pitz, T. Chmura, and S. Kube, Experiments and
Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour, April 2003
901  Stergios Skaperdas, Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy
Cannot be Divorced from its Governance, April 2003
902  Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Antonio Garcia Pascual, What Do We Know
about Recent Exchange Rate Models? In-Sample Fit and Out-of-Sample Performance
Evaluated, April 2003903  Mika Widgrén, Enlargements and the Principles of Designing EU – Decision-Making
Procedures, April 2003
904  Phornchanok Cumperayot, Dusting off the Perception of Risk and Returns in FOREX
Markets, April 2003
905  Kai A Konrad, Inverse Campaigning, April 2003
906  Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross
Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, April 2003
907  Giuseppe Bertola and Pietro Garibaldi, The Structure and History of Italian
Unemployment, April 2003
908  Robert A.J. Dur and Otto H. Swank, Producing and Manipulating Information, April
2003
909  Christian Gollier, Collective Risk-Taking Decisions with Heterogeneous Beliefs, April
2003
910  Alexander F Wagner, Mathias Dufour, and Friedrich Schneider, Satisfaction not
Guaranteed – Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy in Western Europe, April
2003
911  Ngo Van Long, Raymond Riezman, and Antoine Soubeyran, Trade, Wage Gaps, and
Specific Human Capital Accumulation, April 2003
912  Andrea Goldstein, Privatization in Italy 1993-2002: Goals, Institutions, Outcomes, and
Outstanding Issues, April 2003
913  Rajshri Jayaraman and Mandar Oak, The Signaling Role of Municipal Currencies in
Local Development, April 2003
914  Volker Grossmann, Managerial Job Assignment and Imperfect Competition in
Asymmetric Equilibrium, April 2003
915  Christian Gollier and Richard Zeckhauser, Collective Investment Decision Making with
Heterogeneous Time Preferences, April 2003
916  Thomas Moutos and William Scarth, Some Macroeconomic Consequences of Basic
Income and Employment Subsidies, April 2003
917  Jan C. van Ours, Has the Dutch Miracle Come to an End?, April 2003
918  Bertil Holmlund, The Rise and Fall of Swedish Unemployment, April 2003
919  Bernd Huber and Marco Runkel, Optimal Design of Intergovernmental Grants under
Asymmetric Information, April 2003
920  Klaus Wälde, Endogenous Business Cycles and Growth, April 2003921  Ramon Castillo and Stergios Skaperdas, All in the Family or Public? Law and
Appropriative Costs as Determinants of Ownership Structure, April 2003
922  Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund, Improving Incentives in Unemployment
Insurance: A Review of Recent Research, April 2003
923  Bernard M.S. van Praag and Adam S. Booij, Risk Aversion and the Subjective Time
Discount Rate: A Joint Approach, April 2003
924  Yin-Wong Cheung, Kon S. Lai, and Michael Bergman, Dissecting the PPP Puzzle: The
Unconventional Roles of Nominal Exchange Rate and Price Adjustment, April 2003
925  Ugo Trivellato and Anna Giraldo, Assessing the ‘Choosiness’ of Job Seekers. An
Exploratory Approach and Evidence for Italy, April 2003
926  Rudi Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, International Financial Crises, April 2003
927  David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, Statements of ECB Officials and their Effect on
the Level and Volatility of the Euro-Dollar Exchange Rate, April 2003
928  Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Assessing the Efficiency of an
Insurance Provider – A Measurement Error Approach, April 2003
929  Paolo M. Panteghini and Guttorm Schjelderup, Competing for Foreign Direct
Investments: A Real Options Approach, April 2003
930  Ansgar Belke, Rainer Fehn, and Neil Foster, Does Venture Capital Investment Spur
Employment Growth?, April 2003
931  Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg, and Jörgen W. Weibull, Social Norms and Welfare State
Dynamics, April 2003
932  Myrna Wooders and Ben Zissimos, Hotelling Tax Competition, April 2003
933  Torben M. Andersen, From Excess to Shortage – Recent Developments in the Danish
Labour Market, April 2003
934  Paolo M. Panteghini and Carlo Scarpa, Irreversible Investments and Regulatory Risk,
April 2003
935  Henrik Jacobsen Kleven and Claus Thustrup Kreiner, The Marginal Cost of Public
Funds in OECD Countries. Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation, April
2003
936  Klaus Adam, George W. Evans, and Seppo Honkapohja, Are Stationary Hyperinflation
Paths Learnable?, April 2003
937  Ulrich Hange, Education Policy and Mobility: Some Basic Results, May 2003
938  Sören Blomquist and Vidar Christiansen, Is there a Case for Public Provision of Private
Goods if Preferences are Heterogeneous? An Example with Day Care, May 2003939  Hendrik Jürges, Kerstin Schneider, and Felix Büchel, The Effect of Central Exit
Examinations on Student Achievement: Quasi-experimental Evidence from TIMSS
Germany, May 2003
940  Samuel Bentolila and Juan F. Jimeno, Spanish Unemployment: The End of the Wild
Ride?, May 2003
941  Thorsten Bayindir-Upmann and Anke Gerber, The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution in
Labor-Market Negotiations, May 2003
942  Ronnie Schöb, Workfare and Trade Unions: Labor Market Repercussions of Welfare
Reform, May 2003
943  Marko Köthenbürger, Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized
Leadership, May 2003
944  Albert Banal-Estañol, Inés Macho-Stadler, and Jo Seldeslachts, Mergers, Investment
Decisions and Internal Organisation, May 2003
945  Kaniska Dam and David Pérez-Castrillo, The Principal-Agent Matching Market, May
2003
946  Ronnie Schöb, The Double Dividend Hypothesis of Environmental Taxes: A Survey,
May 2003
947  Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Stabilizing Competitive Cycles with Distortionary
Taxation, May 2003
948  Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad, Strategic Trade Policy and Merger Profitability, May
2003
949  Frederick van der Ploeg, Beyond the Dogma of the Fixed Book Price Agreement, May
2003
950  Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig, A Microfoundation of Predator-Prey Dynamics,
May 2003
951  Burkhard Heer and Bernd Süssmuth, Cold Progression and its Effects on Income
Distribution, May 2003
952  Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Labour Demand in Germany: An Assessment of Non-
Wage Labour Costs, May 2003